A Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) study
of defined benefit (DB) plans with more than 1,000 participants found
534 had some kind of risk transfer activity in the years 2009 to 2013.
This
number includes 145 cash balance plans, of which 135 are collectively bargained
plans, and 399 traditional DB plans. Fifty of those 534 plans went through a
standard termination—which the researchers call the “ultimate form of
risk transfer.”
More than one million participants left the plans
as a result of the events. Almost 400 of the events involved lump sum
payments; others involved annuity purchases to transfer pension
liabilities.
Information regarding risk transfer activity has
generally been limited to press reports of events conducted by major
companies, the researchers noted. The study is only an estimate of the
level of risk activity since it concludes that a risk transfer has
occurred indirectly by analyzing Form 5500 annual reports. Actuaries
were cautious in declaring a pattern in the data; they think the actual
number of risk transfers was probably higher than indicated by the
study.
PBGC is interested in these events because:
Lower insurance premium payments may affect PBGC’s long-term financial condition;
Past risk transfer activity can help project future activity and help PBGC plan for its effects; and
Participants
may elect to receive lump sums, and if so, policy makers will want to
ensure they have the correct tools to manage their funds wisely.
The
study concludes that the plan sponsor’s financial condition didn’t
determine risk transfer activity, nor did union status. But while union
plans and non-union plans were equally likely to offer risk transfers,
the percentage of union members accepting them was lower.
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ERISA attorney Nancy Ross explains the potential outcomes of
Montanile v. Board of Trustees, a low-flying
but potentially important Supreme Court case testing the difference between damages and equitable
relief within employee benefits law.
Nancy G. Ross is a partner in Mayer Brown’s Chicago office
and a member of the firm’s Litigation & Dispute Resolution practice. She
focuses her practice primarily on the area of employee benefits class action
litigation and counseling under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 (ERISA).
In a recent interview with PLANADVISER, Ross dug into a “potentially
very important but widely unnoticed” Supreme Court case, Montanile v. Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health
Benefit Plan. Strictly speaking the
case falls outside of Ross’s normal focus of ERISA-covered retirement plans, but she believes the issues at hand could have a major impact on both defined contribution and
defined benefit retirement plans.
Ross explains the Supreme Court heard additional oral
arguments in the case in November, so the industry in currently waiting for its
decision.
Q: Montanile v.
Board of Trustees of the National Elevator Industry Health Benefit Plan touches more directly
on the health plan area. But there are implications generally for employee benefits
plans. Can you explain the background of the case and why it might be important
for our readers?
A: Very broad sketch
of the background is that Mr. Montanile was involved in a car accident and his health plan paid for his immediate treatments. As things
typically transpire when you have an individual insurance policy or health insurance via
the employer, very often there is a provision in there that, if
the plan pays your costs for emergency medical treatment, but then you ultimately recover
those costs in court—you must pay back the plan. This is pretty commonplace in employee
benefit plans, especially health coverage.
So Mr. Montanile’s
plan paid for his treatments needed as a result of his accident, but he
subsequently recovered from the guy who caused the accident—referred to in law
as the TORT user. Under plan terms, Mr. Montanile had a fairly clear obligation
to reimburse the plan for his medical costs out of his recovery—but the plan did not immediately ask him to do so and he did not eventually do so. Of critical importance here, the plan waited a pretty substantial
period of time to formally pursue the money it was owed.
So by the time the
plan tried to go after the recovery that Mr. Montanile had received, he had spent
the funds and had otherwise disseminated them elsewhere. So the legal issue at hand becomes,
and it’s only something an ERISA litigator could love to look into, is whether
the plan’s efforts to recover what Mr. Montanile had recovered constituted an effort
to obtain legal damages to be collected from unsegregated assets (which ERISA
does not allow) or whether it could be characterized as some kind of equitable
recovery of the plan’s rightful assets (which the terms of ERISA do allow).
Q: What else is relevant in understanding this case? Did any important lines of thinking or questioning come up during SCOTUS hearing in November?
A: Historically there
have been a couple prior cases where the courts have been asked a similar
question, and they’ve mainly said some confusing things. Generally, the courts
have said the money needs to still be segregated in order for the plan to
recover it under the terms of ERISA. And so, the proper way to proceed is for the plan to put a lien on
the money, hopefully very early in the process.
The plan actually did
this in a timely way, it seems, in this case. But Mr. Montanile nevertheless
spent the money—so there was not a distinct pool of property to support the lien when time
came to collect. So the plan sued and
claimed the plan terms clearly provide that it should be reimbursed for the
cost of Mr. Montanile’s medical treatment. The defendant said no, your case has
no merit because I don’t have the money, so you (i.e., the plan) are effectively
seeking only legal damages that are not permitted by ERISA.
Q: Does this give us a clear sense of where the SCOTUS
justices may come down?
A: I’m not sure. The
lawyers on each side had their arguments. National Elevator’s lawyers argued this
is a ‘deficiency judgement,’ which fits within the realm of equitable relief under
common law. But the court said, it may be equitable in common law, but it’s not
necessarily equitable under ERISA.
What do we know about the
court’s opinion? We know that Mr. Montanile does not technically deny that he
owes the money to the plan under a strict interpretation of plan terms. But the
outstanding question remains, how, if at all, does the plan have a right to recoup
these basic advancements of money, given that the actual dollars have been
spent and/or disseminated?
You have ‘subrogation’
cases like this all the time in fact, so the ramifications for this case, particularly in the private
health insurance world but also for other ERISA plans, are tremendous. The Supreme
Court is being asked to determine what steps, if any, can an employer and a plan
legally take to protect itself and recoup assets in such cases?
It’s too soon to tell
whether the court will give a very narrow ruling and limit it only to the situation at
hand, involving this particular subrogation question, or whether they will open
the question more broadly and ask how plans should be permitted to recoup
payments that are not still being held in a specifically identifiable pot of
money.
Q: What are some potential implications of a broad ruling?
A: One worry that I have
is that, if the court says the plan cannot recoup assets in a case like this,
it will create a direct incentive for plan participants to go out and spend the recovered money very quickly.
It’s kind of astonishing. Mr. Montanile apparently knew there was a lien but
nevertheless spent the money! One could argue something like this should be criminally
prosecutable.
The Department of
Labor wrote a brief weighing in here. They suggested there was clearly malfeasance on the part of the participant, and so they said there is no need for the Supreme Court to act broadly here because there are already strong
steps plans can take to recoup assets. I am not sure I am convinced by their
arguments. For example, they said one major source of protection is immediately
getting a lien on the money and finding a way to monitor this lien, perhaps through
the participant’s attorney, and getting a formal pledge from this attorney or from the
participant that the money won’t be spent besides to reimburse the plan—possibly
even in the form of a restraining order if necessary, prohibiting the participant
from spending the money. The theory being that, if you spend the money then
under this temporary restraining order, you can be ruled in contempt of court.
It’s all a matter of
timing, you can see. Another problem here in this case is that the plan waited what
amount to be a fairly long time to move to collect the lien, so it has just
made the question of whether Mr. Montanile improperly disseminated the funds
even more difficult. It’s less clear of a question—did Mr. Montanile know there
was in fact a lien on the money that would make his actions potentially illegal? How long would he be required to hold the money he legally collected? And did the plan fulfill its obligations to make this lien enforceable? It’s
hard to prove something like this.
Q: What else should we consider as we wait for a decision?
A: One of the justices
asked whether the plan sponsors should have gotten a lien against the attorney’s
fees in this case and collected it from the attorney—whom would therefore have a
powerful incentive to make sure their client was doing the right thing with the
money, i.e., not running out and spending it on a fancy new car to avoid reimbursing
the plan.
You probably would not
have to evoke ERISA if you did this—plans can sue non-ERISA entities outside of
ERISA, as it were. So there would then be, perhaps, an opportunity for the case
to proceed like that under common law, which again is important from the damages
versus equitable relief question.
Depending on how this
comes down, it could have tremendous implications for nullifying the lien as a
recovery device for ERISA-covered plans. In this particular case it is applying
in the case of a health plan, but retirement plans find themselves in fairly
similar situations all the time as well. Frankly, that’s what I care about in
this case. I don’t do a lot of health law litigation at all—but overpayments by
benefit plans are a huge issue. It’s somewhat commonplace, in fact, just given
the complexity of calculations and the fact that mistakes happen. There has
frankly been an increase in those kinds of cases all up and down the court system
and they’re going through similar arguments.
I just saw one example
where a defined benefit plan beneficiary was being paid quite a higher amount
than it turned out the participant was entitled to, but the plan didn’t notice
for three years. So they wanted to offset the sizable overpayment against future benefits, and the guy sued. The district court said,
we think the plan’s actions amounted to constructive fraud, because its
consistent pattern of behavior over three years led this guy to believe he was
entitled to this money. So in that case they employed one of the forms of equitable
relief permitted by ERISA (reformation where there is fraud) to mandate a
reform of the plan.
It becomes a real quagmire when you start actually
weighing the question of, what bearing could this Montanile case have on a plan official trying
to recover overpayments from pension funds or even from defined contribution plans?
It’s of foundational importance for the distinction between damages and
equitable relief under employee benefits law. When people are living on their retirement checks it’s often
week-by-week and month-by-month, so the chances aren’t great to begin with that
the money will even be there for you to recover.