Senator Mike Enzi (R-Wyoming) has
introduced S.3240, described as a bill to prohibit the use of premiums
paid to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation as an offset for other
federal spending.
In an announcement of similar legislation introduced in
the House of Representatives in April, it was explained that under
current law, pension insurance premiums that are paid by employers to
the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) are included in the
federal budget and are considered “on-budget.” This provides the
illusion that this revenue can be used for general government spending,
even though these premiums cannot be allocated to other government
programs besides the PBGC benefit pension plans, the senator explains.
In
recent years, Congress has increased the PBGC premiums several times in
order to offset increased spending; most recently increasing premiums
through 2025 by $7.65 billion in the Bipartisan Budget Act of 2015.
Confronting
these challenges, S. 3240 would ensure that premiums paid to the PBGC
are no longer counted as general fund revenue, eliminating the
motivation for legislators to raise premiums in order to pay for
unrelated initiatives and programs.
In a letter to Enzi, industry
groups thanked him for introducing the legislation. “Eliminating the
ability to ‘double-count’ these premiums for other spending will keep
lawmakers from using pension plans as a piggy bank,” said Lynn Dudley,
senior vice president, global retirement and compensation policy for the
American Benefits Council.
Berkshire Hathaway ERISA Suit Sent Back to District Court
An appellate court has partly reversed the dismissal of
claims against Berkshire Hathaway retirement plan fiduciaries accused of violating
ERISA benefit cutback provisions.
The move by the appellate court actually comes in three
parts. The ruling first affirms the district court’s dismissal of certain claims
against the Berkshire subsidiary Acme, which originally independently owned and operated the relevant
pension plan prior to the Berkshire acquisition; second, it affirms the district
court’s dismissal of the derivative breach of fiduciary duties claim against
Berkshire; and finally, it reverses the district court’s dismissal of all other
claims against Berkshire, sending the bulk of the case back to the district
court for new consideration.
Case documents paint a complicated picture of the suit. Pulling
out some key details, the initial complaint was filed by two present employees
and one former employee in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, challenging Berkshire’s top-down decision to freeze accruals to Acme’s
defined benefit (DB) plan and reduce the company matching contribution rate in
its 401(k) plan.
According to the plaintiffs, Berkshire had acquired Acme in
approximately 2001, and subsequently in 2006 Berkshire executives allegedly
contacted Acme about the possibility of imposing a hard freeze on the pension
plan that would eliminate future accruals of benefits for plan participants
and would preclude participation in the plan by new employees. After receiving
advice from outside ERISA counsel, Acme advised Berkshire that a hard freeze
would violate certain sections of the merger agreement and ERISA. Berkshire
dropped the issue until the summer of 2012, plaintiffs claim, “when it informed
Acme that it wanted to move forward with reducing retirement benefits.”
The plaintiffs contend that the acquisition agreement by
which Berkshire Hathaway acquired Acme approximately 14 years ago requires the
plan sponsor to permit participants to accrue additional defined benefits
indefinitely, at the same rate that benefits were being accrued at the time of
the acquisition, and to make additional 401(k) matches available indefinitely, at the same
rate as the matches at the time of the acquisition. Participants filed the initial suit to attempt to protect these benefits.
NEXT: What the
appellate court said
After its own consideration of the complicated facts at hand,
the appellate court has allowed to stand the lower court’s ruling that Acme should
not be held liable in the case, based on its limited cooperation/control with regard to Berkshires’
alleged ERISA violations.
Further, “Section 5.7 of the merger agreement expressly allows Acme
to amend, modify or terminate any individual company plans in accordance with
the terms of such plans and applicable law,” the appellate court finds. “[The plan provisions being disputed] do nothing to restrict Acme from amending,
modifying, or terminating any of the plans. The provisos instead restrict
Berkshire from causing Acme to reduce benefit accruals or employer
contributions. Thus, plaintiffs’ prayers to enjoin Acme from amending the
Pension Plan to reduce or eliminate future benefits and accruals and to enjoin
Acme from failing to make such 50% contributions to the 401(k) Plan in the
future are wholly inconsistent with a fair reading of Section 5.7 of the
merger agreement.”
This ruling is based on a 2004 case, Habets v. Waste Mgmt., Inc.,
which according to the appellate court previously determined that in this context, “where the
contract language is clear and unambiguous, the parties’ intent is ascertained
by giving the language its ordinary and usual meaning.”
“Accordingly, plaintiffs have failed to plead a plausible
claim to relief that Acme acted inconsistent with the plans when it adopted the
amendment to the Pension Plan in August 2014 and did not retroactively increase
its 401(k) matching contribution,” the appellate court explains. “Additionally,
we agree with the district court that plaintiffs have failed to state plausible
claims for breaches of fiduciary duties against Acme. Acme acted akin to a
settlor of a trust, rather than in a fiduciary capacity, when it implemented
the amendment in August 2014.”
NEXT: Additional
findings from the appellate court
According to the appellate court, the district court “read
plaintiffs’ complaint to seek unalterable, lifetime benefits.” It therefore rejected
plaintiffs’ claims by relying on principles of contract law.
“Citing M & G
Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, it noted that the parties’ agreement must
unambiguously reflect their intent to vest lifetime benefits. Because section
5.7 of the merger agreement is silent regarding the duration of maintaining
Pension Plan benefit accruals and the employer matching contributions, the
district court held that the provision could not be read to vest benefits for
life,” the appellate court explains. “Rather, the district court read the provisions
to be operative for a reasonable time. And because plaintiffs’ complaint did
not allege that fourteen years was an unreasonable amount of time, the district
court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims.”
But, according to the new appellate court ruling, the
district court erred in its construction of plaintiffs’ claims against Berkshire.
“Plaintiffs’ complaint did not seek only lifetime, unalterable benefits. Alternatively,
it sought to enforce a contractual commitment rather than a vested benefit
under ERISA,” the ruling finds. “This is evident by plaintiffs seeking an
order enjoining Berkshire Hathaway from causing Acme to reduce any benefits or benefit
accruals to employees pursuant to the Pension Plan and an order enjoining
Berkshire Hathaway from causing Acme to reduce any employer contribution to the
401(k) Plan.”
The appellate court concludes that “ERISA regulates pension
benefits through statutory accrual and vesting requirements … An employer can
impose extra-ERISA contractual obligations upon itself, and when it does so, these
extra-ERISA obligations are rendered enforceable by contract law … Extra-ERISA
commitments must be found in the plan documents and must be stated in clear and
express language.”
As such, employers “generally are free under ERISA to modify
or terminate plans, but if the plan sponsor cedes its right to do so, it will
be bound by that contract … This court has recognized that a
reservation-of-rights clause in a plan document, which allows a company to
amend or terminate a plan at any time, cannot vitiate contractually vested or
bargained-for rights. To conclude otherwise would allow the company to take
away bargained-for rights unilaterally.”