No Sign of Slowdown in ERISA Suits with BB&T Complaint

BB&T Corporation finds itself in the crosshairs of an increasingly active law firm that has dived headlong into filing big-dollar complaints under ERISA. 

Participants in BB&T Corporation retirement plans accuse the company of breaching the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by favoring its own proprietary investments options and recordkeeping services at the expense of performance.

The case, filed in the United States District Court for the Middle District of North Carolina, is the latest in a string of self-dealing lawsuits filed by the law firm of Schlichter, Bogard and Denton, as well as a handful of other firms specializing in ERISA litigation. The text of the complaint alleges several breaches of fiduciary duties by BB&T Corporation and its board of directors in the management of its employees’ 401(k) plan.

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Clearly echoing the claims in other recent lawsuits, plaintiffs here argue that “in the competitive marketplace for retirement plan services, multi-billion 401(k) plans such as the BB&T plan wield tremendous bargaining leverage, and can obtain high-quality investment management and administrative services at low cost.” But instead of using their large plan’s bargaining power to benefit employees, plaintiffs suggest the company “acted to benefit themselves by using high-cost proprietary investment funds managed by BB&T and its subsidiary and hiring BB&T itself or another BB&T subsidiary to be the plan’s trustee and recordkeeper, and selecting other high-cost investment options.”

According to the text of the complaint, this allowed BB&T and its subsidiaries to collect millions of dollars in revenues, “in an amount that greatly exceeded the value of the services to the plan, thereby enriching BB&T at the expense of plan participants.”

“By acting for their own benefit rather than solely in the interest of plan participants, and failing to adequately consider the use of non-proprietary products and services and other low-cost options available to the plan, defendants breached their fiduciary duties of loyalty and prudence, and engaged in transactions expressly prohibited by ERISA covered up their long campaign of self-interested and imprudent conduct through a series of false and misleading communications to plan participants,” the complaint alleges.

Plaintiffs are asking for the court to remedy these alleged breaches under 29 U.S.C. §§1132(a)(2) and (3) to “enforce defendants’ personal liability under 29 U.S.C. §1109(a) to make good to the plan all losses resulting from each breach of fiduciary duty and to restore to the plan any profits made through defendants’ use of the plan’s assets.”

NEXT: Role of proprietary funds questioned 

As noted, the tenants of this case line up quite closely with a number of suits previously filed in the federal district courts, especially the main charge of self-dealing leveled by plaintiffs: “Despite the many high-quality and low-cost investment options available in the market, the plan’s investment options have contained many of BB&T’s own proprietary mutual funds … Defendants chose the BB&T funds not based on their merits as investments, or because doing so was in the interest of plan participants, but because these products provided significant revenues and profits to BB&T Corporation and its subsidiaries.”

Case documents show that prior to October 1, 2010, the proprietary options in the plan were managed by BB&T Asset Management, Inc., a wholly-owned subsidiary of BB&T Corporation, and were branded as “BB&T” funds. On October 1, 2010, BB&T Asset Management merged into Sterling Capital Management LLC, another wholly-owned subsidiary of BB&T Corporation. Effective February 1, 2011, the BB&T funds were renamed “Sterling Capital” funds, but plaintiffs say they “remained BB&T proprietary funds” for all practical purposes.

“As of January 1, 2007, the date of the previous restatement of the plan and the proposed starting date for plaintiffs’ class, the plan’s designated investment options were exclusively proprietary options, including 16 BB&T mutual funds, the BB&T Common Stock Fund, and the BB&T One-Year Bank Investment Contract,” the complaint explains. “The plan did not include any non-proprietary funds among the designated options until 2009. At that time, the plan continued to include eight BB&T mutual funds, along with the proprietary BB&T Common Stock Fund and One-Year Bank Investment Contract.”

The total annual operating expense or “expense ratio” of the eight BB&T mutual funds ranged between 72 basis points to 153 basis points, which plaintiffs suggest is “far beyond fees readily-available to 401(k) plans even much smaller than the plan.­” Currently, the plan’s designated investment options continue to include six proprietary Sterling Capital mutual funds, with expense ratios ranging from 85 to 103 basis points for equity funds and 59 basis points for the bond fund, again described as “far beyond the fees readily available to 401(k) plans even much smaller than the plan.”

In addition to questioning use of the proprietary mutual funds, plaintiffs also suggest BB&T fiduciaries, rather than using an arm’s length bidding process to hire a recordkeeper, have since at least 2000 used BB&T Corporation’s Trust Division or BB&T’s subsidiary Branch Banking and Trust Company as the plan’s trustee and recordkeeper—accepting fees that were higher than the effective market rate.

BB&T tells PLANADVISER it “intends to vigorously defend against the claims, but because it is pending litigation we cannot comment further.”

The full text of the complaint is here

Considering Risk Transfer Top of Mind for DB Plan Sponsors

Many pension plan sponsors could use help overcoming misconceptions about transferring liabilities to an insurer.

In growing numbers, North American retirement plan sponsors are seeking to reduce or remove the innate risks in their defined benefit (DB) pension plans.

Challenged by enduring marketplace volatility, escalating longevity and mounting Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) premiums, plan sponsors are recognizing the significant risks caused by their pensions—and the detrimental effects these plans can have on shareholder value.

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The survey demonstrates that pension risk management remains top of mind for many plan sponsors, and that a significant percentage of them are actively researching their de-risking options. More than 48% of survey respondents indicated they are either considering transferring, or are very likely to transfer, pension risk this year. This grows to 71% of plan sponsors with more than $250 million assets under management (AUM).

Moreover, one-third of pension plan professionals either partially or fully disagree with the notion that companies gain an advantage by delaying the implementation of risk-management solutions to further benefit from financial market improvements. Forty-two percent of these same professionals either partially or fully disagree with the idea that risk transfer solutions can only be executed once a plan reaches or exceeds full-funded status. These responses foretell a considerable likelihood of plan sponsors taking near-term action to mitigate pension risk.

Increasing awareness of longevity risk and its effect on pension liabilities is another essential trend identified within the survey. Nearly 45% of all respondents have a high or very high level of understanding about the impact increasing longevity is having on their pension obligations. When analyzed by plan size, 57% of plan sponsors with more than $250 million in AUM indicated they have a high or very high level of longevity risk awareness, while 34% of plan sponsors with $250 million or less AUM felt they have a high or very high awareness of such risk.

NEXT: Misconceptions about de-risking

As the survey illustrates, the misconception of pension risk transfer being too cost-prohibitive continues to exist in the marketplace, with more than two-thirds of all survey respondents either fully or partially agreeing with this fallacy. And when responding to the flawed assertion that “reducing defined benefit risk reduces shareholder value,” plan sponsors reacted counter-intuitively, with 21% fully agreeing and 40% partially agreeing. These findings highlight the need to educate the market regarding the cost of pension buyouts as compared to the “economic” cost of retaining pension risk, and the shareholder value that can potentially be created by reducing pension risk.                      

A survey finding of particular interest is that 20% of plan sponsors with more than $250 million AUM said the recent PBGC premium increases in the U.S. have prompted them to fund their pension plans and transfer some or all of the risk to a third-party insurer. Conversely, 45% of plan sponsors with less than $250 million AUM said they would “do nothing.”

Among plan sponsors with more than $250 AUM, 70% are considering, or are very like to consider, using or increasing their use of liability-driven investing (LDI) strategies. Meanwhile, 54% of plan sponsors with less than $250 million AUM are not at all likely to utilize or increase the usage of LDI strategies.

Pension Plan De-Risking, North America 2016, commissioned by Clear Path Analysis and sponsored by Prudential Retirement, examines the views of 123 senior finance, pension, treasury and human resources professionals to better comprehend their outlook on pension de-risking in the current economic landscape. A copy of the report may be obtained for free on Clear Path Analysis’ website.

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