According to the 12th Edition of the “401k Averages Book,” the average total plan cost for a
large retirement plan (1,000 participants) is 1.08%. The study shows the small
plan average investment expense is 1.24%, while the large plan average investment
expense is 1.05%.
“With the DoL’s fee disclosure effective date set
for April 1, knowing if your 401(k) plan fees are reasonable will
be very important,” says Joseph Valletta, co-author of the “401k Averages Book.”
The recent focus on investment expenses is well-reasoned
because the study finds investment expenses account for 95% of the small plan’s
total expenses and 98% of the large plan, according to the authors. “If an
employer really wants to cut their 401(k) costs, they need to examine their
investment-related expenses,” said David Huntley, co-author of the “401k Averages Book.”
The range between the high and low total plan costs on a 100-participant
plan with $50,000 average account balance is .36% to 1.71%.
“With
all the focus on fee disclosure and 408(b)(2), it’s important employers and
their advisers compare their fees to a benchmark and understand where they fit
into the range of costs in the marketplace,” said Huntley.
The12th Edition breaks down investment costs and identifies
the revenue sharing and net investment amounts. The study finds the
average revenue sharing amount
on a small plan is .68%, while the net investment cost is .56%.
“Fee disclosure
is causing some plan sponsors and their advisers to take a more detailed look
at how their investment costs are allocated,” said Valletta.
Published since 1995, the “401k Averages Book” is the only resource book
available for non-biased, comparative 401(k) average cost information. It’s
designed to provide financial professionals and plan sponsors with essential
401(k) cost benchmarking information. The 12th Edition of the “401k Averages Book” is available for $95 and can
be ordered at www.401ksource.com.
Advisers can purchase
an annual individual Advisor License, which
allows them use the data in their client reports.
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Plan Must Restore Misplaced Assets Although not Recovered
A federal appellate court has found that a profit-sharing
plan must pay back more than $1 million in assets wrongly transferred from a
participant’s account, even thought it has not recovered the misplaced funds.
In
upholding a district court judgment, the 2nd U.S. Court of Appeals
said the text of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) makes
clear that Robert Milgrim is permitted to sue the plan for its misapplication
of his funds to an account for his ex-wife and to seek enforcement of the
resulting award against plan assets.
The
plan argued the anti-alienation provisions of ERISA prohibit plan funds from
being used to satisfy the district court’s judgment, as it would take away from
other participants’ benefits. The appellate court disagreed both because
undistributed funds held in trust for the members of a defined contribution
pension plan do not constitute “benefits” within the meaning of the
anti-alienation provisions, and because the anti-alienation rule does not
prevent pension plan assets from being used to satisfy a judicial judgment that
has been entered against the plan itself.
“If
it were true that, once credited to a particular participant’s account, Plan
funds become ‘benefits’ whose alienation and assignment is prohibited by ERISA,
then the plan administrator would be prohibited from debiting participants’
accounts even to cover expenses that ERISA and the Plan specifically
contemplate they will bear,” the court wrote in its opinion.
The
court pointed out that Section 6.1 of the plan’s document, from which the plan
draws its definition of “benefits,” is entitled “Determination of Benefits Upon
Retirement” and clearly states that the relevant calculations are to be
performed “[u]pon [the plan participant’s] Normal Retirement Date or Early
Retirement Date.” Plan assets therefore become “benefits” only when they are
finally distributed to the participant at the time of retirement. “A single
participant’s ‘account’ is merely a bookkeeping entry that is used at the time
of his retirement to determine what benefits he is entitled to receive,” the
court said.
In
addition, according to the opinion, the structure of the statute strongly
suggests a distinction between using plan assets to satisfy the debts of the
plan and using plan assets to satisfy debts of plan participants. ERISA §
206(d) outlines several carefully circumscribed exceptions to its general
prohibition on the alienation or assignment of pension benefits (see 29 U.S.C.
§ 1056(d). Each of these exceptions addresses restrictions that the
anti-alienation provision places on pension beneficiaries; no mention is made
of similar restraints on plan administrators.
The
plan argued that ERISA was passed at a time when defined benefit pension plans
were the most common and defined contribution pension plans were rarely used,
and the distinction between the plan types and how they are funded requires the
court to apply this nuance to its ruling. The consequence of these distinctions
is that, whereas satisfaction of a judgment from the corpus of a defined
benefit plan may not affect individual participant benefits, in the case of a
defined contribution plan, it will almost certainly do so, since the employer
is under no ongoing obligation to fund the plan to maintain benefits at a set
level. The plan argued that imposing these costs on pension beneficiaries
undercuts ERISA’s policy goals and violates the anti-alienation
provision.
However, the court said it is the
distinctive feature of defined contribution plans that they require the
employee, rather than the employer, to bear the pension risks associated with
investment instability, underfunding, beneficiary longevity and litigation. By
design, participants in a defined contribution plan bear the risk that the
value of their accounts will be reduced as a result of actions taken by the
plan administrator; just as the anti-alienation provision does not protect
participants against poor investment decisions by the plan administrator, it
does not protect them against the risk that poor management decisions will
expose the plan’s assets to liability.
The
plan also contended that if the plan administrator were to use plan assets to
satisfy the judgment it would be acting in its own interest and not that of
participants as ERISA’s fiduciary rules require, but the court reiterated that
the plan is under a legal duty to reimburse Milgram, so payment of the judgment
is therefore a ministerial function, not a discretionary one to which fiduciary
liability might attach.
Milgram
seeks to recover approximately $1.5 million in pension assets and accrued
earnings and interest from The Orthopedic Associates Defined Contribution
Pension Plan, which in 1996 erroneously transferred half the balance of
Milgram’s pension account to his ex-wife, Norah Breen.
The
U.S. District Court for the Northern District of New York granted Milgram
judgment against the plan in that amount and granted the plan an equivalent
judgment against Breen. Two years of litigation failed to result in recovering
the funds from Breen. Breen moved to have the judgment against the plan
enforced.
Orthopedic
itself was formally designated as plan administrator; however, it employed an
outside entity on a contract basis to provide day-to-day administrative
services. During the period relevant to the lawsuit, those services were
provided by the Bay Ridge Group, which was headed by Robert Sedor.
The
district court dismissed charges against Bay Ridge and Sedor, finding they were
not acting as fiduciaries when the funds were wrongly transferred.
The opinion in Milgram v. Orthopedic
Associates et al. is here.