TDFs See Significant Growth in 401(k)s

Assets in target-date funds (TDFs) grew to $380 billion by year-end 2011 and are targeted to reach $1.1 trillion in 2016.
 

According to research conducted by Cerulli Associates, as a result of the growth, TDFs will comprise 10% of 401(k) allocation, up from 2% in 2002.

Most proprietary TDFs remain dominated by defined contribution (DC) plan recordkeepers. However, sponsors of large- and mega-DC plans (those with $50 million or more in assets under administration) are piloting revolutionary shifts in TDF structure, Cerulli noted.

“As a result of a slow movement toward changing target-date structure, opportunity once closed to asset managers, could begin to widen as retirement plans across all segments reevaluate their target-date fund offerings and dominant proprietary funds of the past give way to customizable and passive solutions,” said Alessandra Hobler, an analyst at Cerulli Associates and co-author of the research.

Hobler contends that as far as the participant is concerned, the changes to TDFs will be minimal and accumulator investors will continue to be offered target dates as a QDIA. The simplicity and automation plan participants appreciate will continue to be provided to them, even as TDFs evolve. The difference will lie in how the funds are structured, and that will depend upon the size of the DC plan. The change in TDF structure will be a result of the different needs brought forth by the various differentials in DC plan size.Plan sponsors and advisers in the small- and mid-sized retirement plan market (plans with between $1 million and $50 million in assets) most often have cost and resource challenges to making plan advancements such as open architecture. As a result of their lack of scale, small plans may favor reduction of expenses through index funds or bundled providers, as they do not have the asset base to produce economies of scale. The increased transparency and reduction in fund expenses combined with simplified participant communication could further adoption of index TDFs particularly in the small- and mid-sized plan markets. In addition to eliminating concerns around expenses, a passive solution also eliminates fiduciary concerns around monitoring underlying funds. Since passive target-date funds follow an index, conflicts between core-lineups and target-date funds would be dispelled.

"Index target-dates in DC plans are becoming a larger percentage of total DC target-date flows and have seen an increase in flows over the past five years," reports Hobler. "In 2005, these funds were actually in outflows, representing -0.1% of total DC flows. However during the course of five years, DC index target-date funds have grown to represent 6.3% of total DC flows."

The large and mega retirement plan markets (plans with greater than $50 million in assets) function on a significantly more institutional base than the small- and mid-sized plan markets. Due to their institutional structure and significant asset totals, sponsors of large and mega plans have found that they have the scale to provide custom target-date funds. Differing significantly from the small- and mid-sized plan market, these plans can leverage existing investment teams and consultants to create custom glidepaths and monitor underlying funds.

 "Asset managers who have significant business in the large and mega plans in terms of investment-only assets could benefit from the opening of target-date funds in this space," according to Hobler.

Additional findings from the report include:

•  Approximately $110 billion of the $323 billion of DC plan dollars that rolled over in 2010 will go to self-directed IRAs, while the majority, or $211 billion, will be adviser-directed.

•  Fifty-eight percent of households do not have a retirement income plan in place five-to-10 years from retirement. That number improves to 46% within five years of retirement. Still, nearly half of all households do not have a retirement income plan in place as they approach retirement.

These findings were published from The Cerulli Edge: Retirement Edition, 1Q 2012 issue.

 

J.P. Morgan Paid $384 Million in Arbitration Loss

J.P. Morgan Chase paid $384 million to American Century Investment Management after losing an arbitration over accusations of breaches related to the bank’s purchase of American Century.

According to news reports, the American Arbitration Association said J.P. Morgan’s Asset Management unit purposely violated an agreement tied to the purchase of American Century in 2003, by promoting its own funds at the expense of American Century’s.

In the American Arbitration Association’s 72-page decision it stated, “J.P. Morgan breached the contract over and over again. Evidence that compels this finding and conclusion of the one-sided sales and marketing support given to J.P. Morgan Asset Management and its funds is voluminous.”

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According to the arbitration panel, J.P. Morgan agreed to promote the American Century funds when it bought Retirement Plan Services in 2003. However, J.P. Morgan, which held a large minority stake in American Century’s parent company had wanted to buy the entire company. The panel said J.P. Morgan’s personnel thought if American Century funds performed worse, then the company’s value might fall, therefore making it less expensive to purchase.

After the purchase J.P. Morgan pushed in-house funds and encouraged customers to swap out of American Century funds and also awarding bonuses for selling J.P. Morgan products, the panel said.

American Century won the arbitration ruling on August 10, 2011. The award was confirmed by a Missouri state court on December 6, 2011. The award remained confidential until J.P. Morgan agreed to disclosure the information on Wednesday. The payout includes the $373 million arbitration award plus interest.

In an e-mailed statement to The New York Times, J.P. Morgan Spokeswoman Kristen Chambers said, “We disagree strongly with the arbitrators’ decision and award because, among other things, it misinterprets the contract; ignores facts favorable to us, such as the performance of certain American Century funds during the period in dispute; and ignores expert opinions that were favorable to us.”

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